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POPULIST GOVERNANCE ON THE RISE:  
THE CASE OF DUTERTISMO IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the central elements of Dutertismo – Rodrigo Duterte’s brand of 
populism in the Philippines in his first three years in office. Using Paul Taggart’s analytical 
theory on populism, this paper argues that upon Duterte’s assumption to office, he has used 
populism to maintain a steady grip on power, while concurrently portraying “Others”, 
particularly members of the once dominant Liberal Party, the media, Roman Catholic Church 
and most controversially, drug users as enemies of the State; and sheds light on how Duterte 
deals with reactions from external actors such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
international human rights groups who, according to him, have been ‘attacking our 
sovereignty’. It also looks into how he justifies and legitimizes his populist actions by 
framing and exaggerating the drug problem as a national crisis, exploiting national surveys 
and the social media, and offering vague policies and agenda. Lastly, this paper presents the 
chameleonic nature of Duterte’s politics by looking at his coalition with relatively liberal 
institutions such as the Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines, and 
his relationships with the Communist Left. This analysis gives us an unprecedented 
opportunity to move from discussing the explanations on the rise of Duterte in 2016 into 
exploring the nuances of Rodrigo Duterte’s regime and major developments in the 
Philippines three years after his electoral victory. 
Keywords: populism; Dutertismo; Rodrigo Duterte; Philippines  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Rodrigo Duterte’s inauguration on June 30, 2016 as the Philippines’ 16th president 
was a key turning point in the country’s history. Almost as old as the post-Philippine 
independence, Duterte is the first Philippine president from Mindanao, the country’s 
southernmost island also considered to be the most conflict-ridden and impoverished. He is 
also the first Filipino local politician, having been Mayor of Davao City for 20 years, to be 
catapulted to Malacañan Palace, the nation’s highest seat of power in Manila. 
Duterte’s electoral success, however, is not an isolated case. It is part of a populist 
movement that has been sweeping many countries across the world. In recent years, much of 
liberal democracies have seen a trend of electoral setbacks to another. Strongman populists 
have started to depose the liberal establishment. This global populist wave has given rise to 
increased attention among scholars, reporters, and politicians alike, and prompted a 
seemingly intense and on-going debate centered on searching for a general explanation for its 
rise and success. 
In the Philippines, significant political occurrences over the past 50 years have 
highlighted the transition from authoritarianism to a distinct phase of democratization. 
Between 1972 to 1986, the country was under Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian rule. During 
this period, he put the country under martial law that gave him direct control over the state, 
and accumulated large amount of wealth for his family and his cronies. After the fall of 
Marcos in 1986 through the “People Power Revolution”1 led by democracy icon Corazon 
Aquino, a new “EDSA 2  Republic” was put in place. This was underpinned by a new 
 
1 Also called the EDSA Revolution, was a nonviolent uprising in the Philippines in February 1986 that led to the 
collapse of Marcos’ authoritarian government and the installation of Corazon Aquino as President of the 
Republic.  
2 EDSA is an acronym for Metro Manila’s main highway, the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, where the series of 
rallies and protests occurred. 
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constitution anchored on the institutions, values, principles of liberal democracy. Ironically, it 
also led to the prevalence of ruling elites and developed an illusion of democracy through 
periodic elections, and reinforcement of system checks and balances among government 
institutions, among others. The liberal democratic establishment persisted to the succeeding 
administrations, although under different narratives: Fidel Ramos’ “Philippines 2000”, 
Joseph Estrada’s “Erap para sa mahirap” (Erap for the poor), Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s 
“Strong Republic”, and Benigno Aquino III’s “Daang Matuwid” (Straight Path). 
Arguably, the establishment has seen its highest and lowest points during the Aquino 
administration. In his six years in office, the country has experienced impressive economic 
and political improvements, as supported by reports such as the International Institute for 
Management Development’s (IMD) World Competitiveness Yearbook and World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, among others. However, a series of events and 
crises, particularly the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) Scandal, Mamasapano 
Incident, and Typhoon Haiyan rehabilitation tested the legitimacy of this prevalent political 
order. 
The electoral victory of Duterte in 2016 is a clear example of the rise of a populist in 
government since the country’s experience of multi-dimensional crises under the Aquino 
administration. His first three years in office has seen the limited capacity of domestic actors 
to react against Duterte, in which neither the established political parties nor independent 
institutions have had enough legitimacy and influence to oppose his administration. Given 
this context, this thesis seeks to answer the core research puzzle:  
3 
 
What are the central elements in Rodrigo Duterte’s populist politics dubbed as 
‘Dutertismo’3 as observed in his first three years in office? 
 
In order to answer this question, the study adopts Paul Taggart’s analytical theory on 
populism4 which suggests that populism is characterized by (a) a critique of the internal and 
external establishment; (b) a heartland for “the people” that the populist message refers to; (c) 
a lack of core values; (d) a sense of crisis and the need for more direct populist democracy; 
and (e) a charismatic leadership combined with chameleonic nature to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  
 
Employing this theory in analyzing secondary resources such news reports, public 
speeches, survey results, and official policy documents, this study argues that upon his 
assumption to the country’s highest seat of power, Duterte has used his style of populism 
dubbed as Dutertismo to: 
1.) maintain a steady grip on power, while concurrently portraying “Others” 
particularly members of the once dominant Liberal Party, the media, Roman 
Catholic Church and most controversially, drug users as enemies of the State;  
2.) deal with reactions from external actors such as the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and international human rights groups who, according to him, have been 
‘attacking our sovereignty’;  
3.)  frame and exaggerate the drug problem as a national security crisis; 
4.)  sustain his popularity through his vague policies and agenda, and proactive mass  
mobilization projects in social media and national surveys; and  
 
3 Dutertismo was first coined by Filipino sociologist Randy David to describe Rodrigo Duterte as the “Filipino 
incarnation of a style of governance that is enabled by public’s faith in the capacity of a tough-talking, willful, 
and unorthodox leader to carry out drastic actions to solve the nation’s persistent problems.” 
4 Paul Taggart, Populism, Open University Press, Buckingham and Philadelphia, 2000. 
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5.)  build coalitions with relatively liberal institutions such as the Philippine National  
Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Communist Left. 
 
This thesis takes the form of a case study, defined as something that requires various 
perspectives, and is rooted in a specific context viewed as critical to the understanding of the 
investigated phenomena. It examines what’s in store for the populist phenomenon in the 
Philippines, as marked by the significant developments following Duterte’s presidential 
victory. 
 This paper is structured as follows: the first chapter is the introduction that provides 
the background and research question. The second chapter contains the literature review that 
explores the challenges for liberal democratic regime and the rise of populism in liberal 
democracies, including the Philippines. The third chapter discusses the theoretical framework, 
research design and methodology of the study. The fourth chapter contextualizes the rise of 
Duterte by exploring the significant political developments in contemporary Philippines, 
while the fifth chapter aims to answer the main research question through a case study of the 
Philippine context exploring the central elements of Dutertismo. The final chapter contains 
the conclusion and discussion of implications.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. The International Liberal Democratic Regime and the Global Populist Wave  
Liberal democracy and its vulnerabilities 
Francis Fukuyama, through his book "The End of History and the Last Man", argues 
that after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, liberal democracy has 
become the final ideological phase of human evolution.5 He sees no further direction for 
history after the conflict between the liberal West and the communist world has been settled. 
This argument is drawn from Kojeve's interpretation of Hegelian philosophy that “the final 
condition of humanity's socio-political order is a homogeneous state ruled by a single 
victorious ideology.” A "post-political" society that is not bound by ideological differences 
will eventually result to the end of ideology (and thus of history).  
Heydarian6 echoes the conventional democratization theory which emphasizes that 
post-autocratic societies, specifically third wave democracies, go through several phases. 
This include the "opening" or transition from autocratic rule after a period of political 
liberalization; "breakthrough," a minimalist-procedural democracy where at least a fair and 
competitive elections takes place; "consolidation", which ensures that political actors, 
including the military, acknowledge and accept the legitimacy of elections in the acquisition 
and transfer of state power; and maturity or "deepening" where both the state and civil 
society systemically internalizes individual and collective civil liberties and political rights. 
 
 
 
5 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest (1989), https://www.embl.de/aboutus/ 
science_society/discussion/discussion_2006/ref1-22june06.pdf 
6 Richard Javad Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018). 
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However, many third wave countries remain in the process of achieving well-
functioning democracies.7 Carothers8 and Kurlantzick9 both observe that beyond the facade 
of lively democratic politics, many of these countries suffer deficits of democracy. Carothers 
adds that despite the conduct of elections, representation of citizen's interest remains lacking, 
political participation beyond voting and confidence in state institutions are at low levels, 
government officials frequently abuse the law, elections with uncertain legitimacy are 
conducted, and the state continues to perform poor.  
Samuel Huntington 10  also warns about "erosion of democracy" in third wave 
democracies attributed to the fragility of democratic institutions resulting from "decay of the 
administrative organization inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of 
the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence.”  This, for Foa 
and Mounk11 has resulted to a troubling phenomenon called "democratic fatigue" as more 
citizens become more comfortable with the notion of autocratic rule and military takeover. 
Contemporary Challenges in the Liberal Democratic West  
 Europe  
 Europe plays a key role in promoting democracy by supporting many democratic 
movements and serving as an example of its virtues. But current issues on large-scale 
immigration, increased economic inequality, reduced confidence in state institutions, and 
economic shocks all drive the fading popularity of liberal values and the return of nativist 
 
7 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
8 Thomas Carothers, “The End of Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13 no.1 (2002): 5-21. doi: 
http://journalofdemocracy.org/article/end-transition-paradigm. 
9 Joshua Kurlantzick, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” Foreign Policy (2013).http://foreignpolicy.com/ 
2013/03/04/one-step-forward-two-steps-back/.   
10 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in changing Societies. (London: Yale University Press, 1968). 
11 Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation,” Journal of Democracy 28 (2017): 5-
16, doi: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-11-14/democracy-after-trump. 
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sentiments.12 These contemporary challenges gave rise to illiberal democracies and populist 
movements in many of the world's oldest democracies, such as Hungary and Poland. In the 
United Kingdom, this phenomenon is underscored by the controversial and historic "Brexit" 
vote led by Nigel Farage of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). In France, 
Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front (FN) Party acquired 40% of votes, enough to 
catapult her to the second round for the race to the Elysee Palace.   
 United States 
 With a presidential campaign tinged on anti-immigration and anti-globalization 
rhetoric, Donald Trump's victory against Hillary Clinton in 2016 perfectly reflects the 
crumbling foundations of oldest democracies. Trump's campaign is mainly due to the several 
decades of geographic and economic inequality in the US, and the failure of the government 
to address it. 13  As Fukuyama observes, "there is indeed a problem of representation in 
American institutions: neither political party has served the declining group [blue collar white 
American workers] well.”14 
Democratic Backsliding beyond the West  
 Many non-Western democracies, many of which are emerging market economies, are 
also experiencing a comparable period of democratic disruption and upheaval. 15  These 
include Turkey, Thailand, Kenya and Russia, whose economies have been performing 
 
12 Niall Fergusonm, “Populism as a Backlash against Globalization,” Center for International Relations and 
Sustainable Development, Autumn (2016), http://www.cirsd.org./en/horizons/horizons-autumn-2016--issue-
no-8/populism-as-a-backlash-against-globalization. 
13 Thomas Piketty, “We must rethink globalization, or Trumpism will prevail,” The Guardian. Last modified 
November 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/16/globalization-trump-
inequality-thomas-piketty. 
14 Francis Fukuyama, “American Political Decay or Renewal? The Meaning of the 2016 Election,” Foreign Affairs 
(2016).  https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/american-political-decay-or-
renewal. 
15 Larry Diamond, “Democracy after Trump: Can a Populist Stop Democratic Decline?,” Foreign Affairs (2016). 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-11-14/democracy-after-trump. 
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relatively well over the past two decades.  As Sharma16 notes, the total amount of capital flow 
into these emerging markets reached a record of 478% in the period of 2005-2010, a big jump 
from 92% from 2000-2005.  In a decade, the developing world also managed to double its 
share of world GDP, from 20% to 40%. From 2003 to 2007, the average GDP growth rates of 
these economies also doubled from 3.6 to 7.2%, as compared to the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, even in the most successful emerging market democracies outside the West, the re-
emergence of the autocratic approach to governance seems to be more apparent.  
 Asia 
 In Japan, the status of civil rights and press freedom has significantly eroded upon the 
return to power of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2012. In fact, from 2010-2015, the country's 
ranking in the Press Freedom Index dropped to 61st from 11th, one of the worst cases of 
suppression of press freedom in the world. McCurry 17  notes that this can be primarily 
attributed to Abe’s repressive maneuvers to restrain criticisms toward the government's 
policies and increasing calls for changing the constitution. Due to political pressures from the 
government which limit freedom to express liberal standpoints, some well-known Japanese 
newscasters, including Shigetada Kishii, Hiroko Kuniya, and Ichiro Furutachi, were forced to 
resign from their jobs. The situation in Japan is unlikely to improve as Abe continues to have 
a steady grip on power with the resurgence of the one-party rule, combined with the strong 
support by the majority of the voting public, and no clear challenge from the opposition.  
 Meanwhile, in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also solidifying his grip in 
Indian politics. His prime ministership is best known for empowering Hindu-nationalist 
elements at the expense of the non-Hindu minorities and secular traditions. Though hailed by 
 
16 Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracle, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2013). 
17 Justin McCurry, “Abe defends Japan’s secret s law that could jail whistleblowers for 10 years,” The Guardian. 
Last date modified December 10, 2014,  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/10/japan-state-
secrets-law-security-dissent. 
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his supporters as incorruptible and decisive, his critics argue that under his watch, the country 
has experienced an increasing number of harassment cases toward domestic and foreign civil 
society groups and scholars, and the gradual erosion of pluralistic, liberal values. He has also 
alienated many leading technocrats, including the central bank governor and former IMF 
chief economist, Raghuram Rajan. 
 In Turkey, President Recep Tayip Erdogan rapidly transformed the country hailed as 
the model for Islamic democracy to a pro-authoritarian state. Under Erdogan's rule, the 
system of checks and balances has been put aside. Political dissenters have also been silenced, 
with nationwide publications such as Zaman being closed down, and a number of journalists 
put in jail. Because of this, Turkey has now surpassed both China and Iran for having the 
most number of jailed journalists in the world. Akyol18 also notes that the 2016 failed coup 
against the ruling Justice and Development Party has only bolstered Erdogan's claim to 
authority and influence, and concentrated more authority in his office.   
 In Southeast Asia, the leading democracies are also undergoing the same democratic 
woes. In Indonesia, the incumbent president Joko Widodo was almost defeated by rival 
Prabowo Subianto in the 2014 presidential elections.19 Subianto's campaign was anchored on 
the promise to bring back the Suharto-style of autocratic leadership, reflecting the yearning of 
many Indonesian voters for a strongman who can combat the widespread corruption during 
the reformasi or Post-Suharto period.  Jokowi, however, was able to secure the presidency 
with the help of the 11th hour mobilization of the millennial and middle class voters. 
Jokowi's dramatic presidential victory was largely driven by his style of populism that 
promised grassroot leadership, inclusive development, and disciplining of the oligarchy. But 
 
18 Mustafa Akyol, “Coming Soon: Erdogan ‘The Chief’,” Al-Monitor.com. Last date modified February 2017. 
http//www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/turkey-erdogan-movie-boost-cult-personality.html. 
19 Marcus Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in 
Indonesia,(East West Center, 2015). https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ps072. 
pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35018 
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in his first two years, many has observed Jokowi's strongman leanings as he attempted to 
surmount opposition and vested interests from various political parties. He has adopted a 
tough approach to maintain law and order, particularly drug trafficking, by bringing back 
execution of drug traffickers and dealers; and implemented more protectionist-nationalist 
economic policies.  
Populist Ascendancy  
 Hannah Arendt20 analyzes how a society's rapid modernization has brought to the 
population a sense of alienation and dislocation. Her focus is on the emergence of the “mass 
society,” a group of individuals unable to engage as active and empowered citizens in 
mainstream politics. With the deep desire to gain political voice against the powerful elites, 
the masses have become vulnerable to mobilization by populist leaders who offer simplistic 
and instant solutions in return for complete obedience to authority. As Arendt puts, “mass 
society is always prone to accept a person offhand for what he pretends to be, so that a 
crackpot posing as a genius always has a certain chance to be believed.”21  
2.2. Populist Ascendancy in the Philippines  
 The 2016 Philippine presidential elections was a crucial turning point in Philippine 
history. Rodrigo Duterte, the mayor of Davao City in southern Philippines for more than 20 
years, was catapulted to the nation‟s highest seat of power, beating rival liberal and reformist 
candidates Manuel Roxas and Grace Poe. Arguably, his electoral success is hinged on his 
effective deployment of the populist style. This paper delves into the different perspectives on 
Duterte‟s rise to power and attempts to understand his brand of populism - “Dutertismo.”  
 
 
20 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973). 
21 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
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Attempts to explain the electoral victory of Rodrigo Duterte and the rise of populism in the 
Philippines  
 Heydarian 22  analyzes how Duterte's brand of populism gained ground in the 
Philippines whose economy has been booming over the past few years. His work places the 
electoral victory of Duterte on the wave of populism across Asia and beyond, emphasizing 
the failure of liberal democracy in coping up with the challenges of globalization. 
 His arguments are based on Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing 
Scenarios in 1968 and Francis Fukuyama’s Political Order and Political Decay in 2014. 
Huntington discusses an important dynamic in post-colonial economies - the “aspiration 
institutionalization gap.” What happens with economies that are growing fast and doing well, 
aspirations of people increases exponentially and so does social mobilization. But the ability 
of institutions to respond to new demands of having political voice and for better delivery of 
public services only increases arithmetically. That creates a gap which causes what is called 
grievance politics. Similar observations by Fukuyama on contemporary democracies reveal 
that the rigidity and/or capture by vested interests of state institutions has led in the failure to 
provide adequate public goods.  These observations are in many ways experienced by the 
Philippines under the administration of Duterte's predecessor, Benigno Aquino III. At some 
point during his presidency, the Philippines became the fastest growing economy in Asia and 
the 4th fastest economy in the world. Paradoxically, as the Philippines grew faster, poverty 
became more evident. This was brought by the inability of the country’s economic and 
political institutions to provide inclusive development and efficiently supply basic public 
goods. The broken promises, coupled with rising expectations among middle class, created a 
form of grievance politics that reflects the exasperation toward the post-dictatorship ruling 
 
22 Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy 
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elite. This provided a “fertile ground for populists and demagogic figures to step into the 
picture and exploit the wellspring of discontent across all sections of the society.”  
 Heydarian23 notes that Duterte was able to take advantage of this growing resentment 
over the establishment to contest the highest seat of power in the country. He skillfully 
marketed himself “as the underdog, a simple folk and provincial mayor [of the southern city 
of Davao] audaciously taking on the 'big machine' and 'Imperial Manila' elites."   
 Meanwhile, the work of Thompson24 explores the "systemic disjunction" within the 
liberal reformist political order adopted by the Aquino government. Duterte's campaign is 
considered as an effective protest vote against the narrative of good governance ("no 
corruption, no poverty"), key strategic groups (the Catholic Church, big businesses, social 
democratic activists, and the military) and relatively liberal institutions (traditional political 
parties and the judiciary). Duterte's presidential victory paved the way for a "new political 
order" that employs an illiberal populist law and order narrative. He has also formed a new 
ruling coalition with the Philippine National Police and the communist left that is very 
distinct from the previous liberal order.  
 Teehankee25 explains the "inevitable rise" of Duterte by situating his presidency in the 
cycles of presidential regimes in the country. Following Stephen Skowronek's work, he 
examines how political leaders shape political regimes by transforming narratives into 
governance scripts. Teehankee locates Duterte's rise "in between structural regimes and 
agential choices." For Teehankee, Duterte's fierce rhetoric combined with the public's 
economic dissatisfaction created favorable conditions for Duterte's rise. He successfully 
tapped “into the 'politics of anger' fuelled by the general sense of frustration among the voters 
 
23 Ibid. 
24 Mark Thompson, “Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformism in the Philippines.” 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35 (2016), (3), 39–68. 
25 Julio Teehankee, “Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte Presidency in  Philippine Political 
Time.” Journal of Developing Societies, 32 (2017), (3), 293–321. 
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and the growing desire for a strong leader to restore law and order.”   
 Teehankee and Thompson 26  argue that while it is often claimed that Duterte's 
supporters are, for the most part, from the “the poor, uneducated constituency vulnerable to 
demagoguery" or the "masa" voters because of his seemingly simplistic solutions to the 
country's complex problems, his strongest support comes, in fact, from the upper and middle 
classes, the so-called “ABC” voters. As Teehankee puts it:  
the Duterte phenomenon was not a revolt of the poor but was a protest of the 
 new middle class who suffered from lack of public service, endured the horrendous 
 land and air traffic, feared the breakdown of peace and order and silently  witnessed        
their tax money siphoned by corruption despite promises of improved 
 governance [from the Aquino regime].  
 Abinales27 offers a different perspective on Duterte's rise to power. He underscores 
that “localist mentalite is what underpinned voters‟ confidence in Duterte; not 
disappointment over President Benigno Aquino III or because corruption has become worse.” 
His argument rests on the fact that Aquino consistently acquired at least 51% satisfaction 
rating until the end of his term in 2016, and that there is no sufficent evidence showing that 
Filipinos believe corruption has gotten worse. For Abinales, the enduring mistrust of the 
public on the legal system forced them to secure the help of “local Robin Hoods, trusted 
because they know how to dodge the system and act – often with impunity – outside the legal 
box.” Duterte perfectly fits the criteria - compared to his other political competitors seeking 
to follow the steps of Aquino, he offered vague, uncomprehensive programs for national 
development, did not act presidential, was politically inarticulate, and delivered invective-
 
26 Julio Teehankee and Mark Thompson, “The Vote in the Philippines: Electing a Strongman.” Journal of 
Democracy, 27, 4, (2016), 124–134. 
27 Patricio Abinales, “The 2016 Philippine Elections: Local Power as National Authority.” Asia Pacific Bulletin, 
December 2016,  344, 31, www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb344. pdf?file=1& 
type=node&id=35654. 
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filled campaign speeches - apparently making him the underdog. But the more he boasted his 
success in Davao City, the more Filipinos began to take a second look at this candidate from 
the South.  As Abinales notes,  
 [Filipinos] started to admire what Davao had become – a city that has 
 metamorphosed from the nation’s political assassination center in the 1970s and 
 1980s to the safest in the country. If Duterte can do this to Davao, what can he do 
 about the criminals of our other cities and towns?  
 Indeed, Duterte’s presentation of himself as an effective and competent leader 
(through his “Davao model”), coupled by his portrayal of the Philippines as a country beset 
by the prevalence of crimes and drugs and in need of a decisive and strong leader, has 
catapulted him to the highest seat of power.   
   Curato28 further explained that understanding Duterte and his approach to politics and 
governance also requires the understanding of his region. For more than 20 years, his strategy 
was to use brute force and astute political skills in order to transform Davao into what it is 
today. An important factor to this is the Davao Death Squad (DDS) - a vigilante group of 
"local thugs, rebels, ex-soldiers and policemen" who were commanded to kill suspected drug 
dealers, muggers, and rapists. However, up to this day, direct links between Duterte and the 
DDS has never been proven. The success story of Davao cannot also be boxed alone on the 
notorious death squad as Duterte also possesses astute political skills of arbitration and 
accommodation. He employed an innovative approach to governance by appointing "deputy 
mayors" from various ethnic groups who can represent the mayor in various kin-based 
conflicts. In other instances, he also used intimidation to drive unruly citizens out of the city 
or give them jobs in the government. All these strategies worked because he “understood the 
 
28 Nicole Curato, “We Need to Talk about Rody.” in A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early 
Presidency. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2017). 
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various sources of polarization in the city. He knew if it was an ethnic conflict, a political 
conflict, and he knew when these conflicts intersected with each other.”  
   The works of Curato29 and Arguelles30 present a different and more inclusive way for 
understanding the emergence of populist phenomenon in the Philippines. Both argue that in 
the current literature, populist publics have traditionally been ignored, if not excluded, “even 
though the phenomenon is about populist voters as much as it is about populist leaders.”  
 In her two-year ethnographic study in Tacloban City, Philippines, Curato contends 
against the portrayal of Duterte supporters as ‘fanatical devotees’, and suggested instead that 
their support for Duterte is a result of opposing yet mutually reinforcing political logics - the 
politics of fear and the politics of hope. “Politics of fear gains currency from the immediate 
need for punitive measures to quell criminality, the politics of hope opens up spaces for 
citizens to visualise better conditions within their lifetime.” By highlighting these logics, 
populism is characterized then as a negotiated relationship between the populist leader and 
his publics – “a relationship that runs much deeper than one-way manipulation and 
demagoguery.”  
 Arguelles, on the other hand, conducted his study in Barangay Tatalon, one of the 
Philippines’ largest and most vote-rich slum communities. His study argued for populist 
public heterogeneity and surfaced grounded populism views. For Arguelles, populism is best 
understood as a political performance that demands from the populist a compelling rhetoric, 
style, and behavior. His research of the populist publics shows that this populist political 
performance has three vital aspects: “serving as a surrogate voice for the miserable, bringing 
authenticity as opposed to hypocrisy in politics, and showing persistent political will.”  
 
29 Nicole Curato, “Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power.” Journal of 
Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35, 3, (2017), 91–109. 
30 Cleve Arguelles, “Grounding Populism: Perspectives from the Populist Publics”, 2017. www.etd.ceu. 
hu/2017/arguelles_cleve.pdf 
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2.3 Gap in Literature and Significance of the Study 
 
 While there is an extensive literature on the relationship between the liberal 
democratic establishment and populism, there remains a lack of in-depth studies that focus on 
the emerging democracies in Southeast Asia. In the case of the Philippines, much of the 
studies focus on the factors that gave rise to Rodrigo Duterte’s phenomenal presidential 
victory, but there is a lack of literature that examines how he employs his populist politics 
known as Dutertismo in the first half (three years) of his six-year term. Moreover, how 
various actors, both domestic and international, are responding to Duterte’s politics remains 
to be explored. Therefore, this work seeks to employ a holistic approach for studying 
populism in the Philippines, taking into account not just the inherent features of Duterte’s 
politics, but also reflecting on the kind of society that has emerged from the era of Dutertismo.  
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III. FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework: Paul Taggart’s Analytical Theory on Populism  
 
 This study adopts the six elements of populism from the work of Paul Taggart.31 He 
demonstrated that populism is characterized by (a) a critique of the internal and external 
establishment; (b) a heartland for “the people” that the populist message refers to; (c) a lack 
of core values; (d) a sense of crisis and the need for more direct populist democracy; (e) a 
charismatic leadership combined with chameleonic nature to adapt to changing circumstances.  
 
Critique of the internal and external establishment. Taggart contends that an 
important feature of populism is its antipathy towards both internal and external 
establishment. These can be the traditional political elites/parties, political structures, and 
practices. As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, Duterte has consistently 
discredited liberal institutions, particularly the legislative and judicial branches of the 
government, as they were seen as primarily responsible for many of the country’s persistent 
problems. He has also openly denounced the Roman Catholic Church, the media, and human 
rights organizations that he believes are barriers to his populist movement. 
 
“Heartland” for the people. Taggart highlights the importance of a connection 
between ‘the people’ and a heartland, an idealized place for the people. For Duterte, he sees 
that this will only be achieved if he gets rid of the main enemies of the State - the drug users. 
His aggressive crackdown on drugs did not sit well with many local and international human 
rights groups arguing that Duterte circumvents due process and human rights. Duterte, 
however, has every intention to defy interventions from the international community, and 
responded to criticisms as an attack to Philippine sovereignty.  
 
31 P. Taggart, Populism, Open University Press, Buckingham and Philadelphia, 2000. 
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Vagueness and lack of core values. Taggart emphasizes the significance of vagueness 
of populism and the lack of core values. In the case of the Philippines, where political 
turncoatism or party-switching remains rampant, Duterte’s PDP-Laban is among the political 
parties without sharp ideological profile. Rather, it resembles a clientelistic network with 
many interest groups represented within it. This is important because PDP-Laban itself is not 
a populist party per se, but uses populist methods to maintain a dominant political party in 
Philippine politics. 
 
Performance of a national crisis. This sense of crisis results in people feeling lost and 
losing faith in the political establishment to deal with the crisis and quickly improve the 
situation. In the Philippines, Duterte effectively created a national crisis out of the drug 
problem, making it a core of his presidential rhetoric. He has continuously criticized the 
once-ruling Liberal Party for failing to address the country's worsening drug use and trade 
problem, and took this as an opportunity to maintain a stronghold in the presidential seat.  
 
Political leadership. While a political leader does not create a populist movement per 
se but needs socio-economic conditions to boost public support for populist discourses, 
leadership is important in populist movements. As will be discussed further in the case study, 
Duterte is considered a charismatic leader who has exploited various platforms, including 
social media and national survey to sustain his popularity and to advance his populist law and 
order narrative.  
 
Chameleonic nature. Taggart highlights that populism has a chameleonic nature; it 
can adapt to different and changing situations. This can also be observed in Duterte’s 
Philippines wherein he was able to forge a coalition with liberal institutions such as the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. He also deliberately 
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made friends with leaders of the Communist Left in order to get more support for his populist 
political agenda.  
   
3.2 Research Design and Methodology 
 
 This study uses the case study approach as the main method for gathering and 
analyzing secondary resources such news reports, public speeches, survey results, and official 
policy documents. The strength of this approach is that it enables the researcher to focus on a 
group, community, event, individual, policy, or even nation-state, and to study them in great 
depth. Since this study analyzes a nation-wide phenomenon, a case study seems to be the 
ideal form of analysis. Furthermore, case studies are also most commonly associated with 
studies that are primarily qualitative, which this study is. Furthermore, this study is 
exploratory in nature it aims to explore a phenomenon, without explicitly focusing on causal 
effects and variables. The broad nature of an exploratory study fits the flexible nature of a 
case study design.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILIPPINES 
INFLUENCING DUTERTE'S APPROACH TO POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 
 
 This chapter contextualizes Dutertismo by exploring the political developments in the 
Philippines prior to the election of Rodrigo Duterte, before returning to Taggart’s analytical 
theory and applying them in more detail to the Philippine context.  
 
4.1 The ambivalent character of elite democracy  
 The liberal democratic order in the Philippines takes its root from American 
colonization. It has, however, struggled to be firmly entrenched in the country. There are 
several reasons to explain this: cultural factors as evidenced by the power of clientelistic and 
familial ties; America's colonial legacies in empowering the land-owning elites; persistent 
socio-economic problems such as poverty and inequality; and institutional nuances, 
particularly in the presidential system that adopts the winner-takes-all election format. From 
1946 until Martial Law declaration in 1972, Philippine democracy had been plagued by 
problems related to poor governance, flawed policymaking, armed insurgency, and elite 
competition. During Martial Law under President Marcos, dictatorship was favored over 
liberal democracy. But in this period, the country experienced heightened corruption and 
repression. Martial Law met its inevitable end through the 1986 People Power Revolution; at 
the same time, pre-martial law era political elites and institutional features were restored.  
 Scholars of Philippine politics acknowledge that the return to democracy following 
the People Power Revolution is a flawed work in progress, often citing elections as marred by 
vote buying and violence, rampant corruption and rent-seeking, policies that have benefitted 
the special interests of elites at the cost of the country's poor, and a weak and inefficient 
judicial system.  
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 Liberal democracy has worked fairly well since its institutionalization in 1986. 
Liberalism's principles and values have influenced the People Power Revolution and the 
establishment of the Philippine Constitution of 1987, leading in constitutionally guaranteed 
human rights, periodic and competitive elections for local and national offices, checks and 
balances system, free press, and a strong civil society. Since 1986, there have been various 
efforts for privatization, deregulation, and economic integration which contributed for 
stronger GDP over the past 10 years. Even so, skepticisms remain on the breadth and depth of 
these reforms to significantly improve the country's economic and political landscapes.  
 The influence and resiliency of the Philippines' elite transcends beyond any 
presidential term limits and power.  Although the presidency exercises power over political 
appointments and budgets, the president's power and influence is transitory as her/his term is 
limited to six years. On the other hand, political and business families - Cojuancos, Aquinos, 
Marcoses, Ayalas and Lopezes, to name a few - have had remarkable adaptability and 
longevity. These families exercise influence over the elections, and lobby for legislation, 
policy-making, jurisprudence, regulation, and distribution of government resources.  
 The country's elite has long limited the growth and development potential of the 
country by restricting the fiscal base of the government, and corrupting, coopting, and 
intimidating the bureaucracy. Because of their practice of collusion and protectionism, they 
have significantly influenced the Philippine economy, putting aside financial competition. 
The elite also continue to dominate policymaking and legislative processes, making it hard 
for governments to adopt and enforce policies that meet the needs of both the middle and 
lower classes. The Philippines remains to be one of the countries in Asia with the highest 
inequality and poverty incidence. Even after a relatively strong macroeconomic growth, 
poverty incidence has only decreased to 21.6 percent in 2015. 
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4.2 The successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (2010-
2016) 
If the 2010 presidential election is any indication, the victory of Benigno Simeon 
Aquino III (affectionately known as PNoy or NoyNoy) seemed to have kick-started a new 
dawn for the Philippines. Being the son of two democratic icons in the country, Benigno II 
and Corazon, he ran a presidential bid anchored on his political message of “Daang Matuwid” 
(Straight Path), promising good governance and anti-corruption. This campaign well 
resonated to the voting public, as the outgoing president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, was 
plagued with various accusations of corruption, abuse of power, and plunder. He succeeded 
in acquiring 42 percent of the total votes and a net trust rating of 74 percent for his pre-
inauguration, almost three times greater than Duterte's in 2016.32 
Arguably, the nation once considered the "sick man of Asia" has grown by leaps and 
bounds under the Aquino administration. For the whole of his term, the Philippines 
experienced political stability and business optimism. In fact, in 2015, it was ranked 4th 
among the world’s fastest growing economies with a GDP growth of 6.7%, only trailing 
behind India, Qatar and China33. It was also the fastest growing economy in Asia in 2016, 
ahead of China and Vietnam. Aquino’s leadership also led to the Philippines’ improved 
performance in major economic indices such as the World Economic Forum’s economic 
competitiveness and Heritage Foundation’s economic openness, integrating it in the global 
economy and eventually making it an emerging market. The Aquino administration was also 
hailed for having achieved the country’s highest average GDP growth rate of 6.26% in five 
 
32 In 2016 elections, Duterte  garnered 39% share of total votes, and 26% pre-inauguration net trust rating.  
Mahar Mangahas, “Baseline trust ratings of Duterte and Robredo.” Inquirer.net, Last modified June 11, 2016, 
http://opinion.inquirer.net/95149/baseline-trust-ratings-of-duterte-and-robredo; Kristine Sabillo, “Aquino 
admin’s last net satisfaction rating ‘very good’ –SWS,” Inquirer.net, Last modified August 15, 2016. http:// 
newsinfo.inquirer.net/806229/Aquino-admin-last-net-satisfaction-rating-very-good. 
33 Kathleen Martin, “In latest CNN Money data: Philippines 4th fastest-growing economy in 2015,” Philstar 
Global. August 3, 2015. https://www.philstar.com/business/2015/08/03/1484131/latest-cnn-money-data-
philippines-4th-fastest-growing-economy-2015 
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decades - significantly higher than the Marcos years (3.43%) or even the Arroyo regime 
(4.46%). Annual growth rates from 2010-2015 were also higher than the average growth rates 
of post-Martial law administrations including Corazon Aquino (3.85%), Fidel Ramos 
(3.75%), and Joseph Estrada (2.3%). Because of this stellar economic performance, the 
Philippines has since been considered by Wall Street Journal as Asia’s “rising star” and 
World Bank as a “new tiger economy.”  
Apart from carrying out a robust macroeconomic policy, the Aquino government also 
initiated anti-corruption drives which aimed to end the seemingly perennial problems of red 
tape and bureaucratic graft, and restore public trust in government agencies. In Aquino’s first 
few years in office, he led the successful impeachment of some high-ranking officials 
appointed by Arroyo in both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court.34 These 
anti-corruption drives were so arduous that it also led to the widely-covered investigation and 
eventual conviction of Arroyo herself and several senators. Because of this, Aquino 
formidably instigated a stronger campaign to combat corruption by making it a centrepiece of 
national political discourse. This has rekindled an old flame in the consciousness of the 
Filipino – to fight and finally put an end on what seems to be an omnipresent feature of 
Philippine politics.  
While this liberal democratic political regime adopted by the Aquino administration 
may have had notable accomplishments, it also had its fair share of shortcomings. In his six 
years in office, Benigno Aquino failed to institutionalize his Daang Matuwid (Straight Path) 
mantra. In his term, important legislations which could have dramatically changed the 
political structure in the country such as the Freedom of Information Bill, Anti-Political 
Dynasty Act, and Political Party Development Act, were introduced in both the upper and 
 
34 These officials include the late Chief Justice Renato Corona who was removed from office for failing to 
release to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN), as required by the Philippine 
Constitution.  
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lower houses of Congress, but were not passed into laws. The period of economic boom was 
largely seen as unequal as it failed to trickle down to the ordinary populace. These events 
further exposed the vulnerability of Aquino’s reformism to a “breakdown.” 
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) Scandal 
One of the most detrimental issues against Aquino’s good governance narrative was 
the controversial Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) - a discretionary fund taken 
from multiple public institutions' unspent assets and allotted to the government’s priority 
projects.35 It was initially intended to address the consequences of spending cutbacks and 
economic slowdown in the first few years of the Aquino government. However, the judgment 
of the Supreme Court on its unconstitutionality resulted in numerous allegations that it was 
being used to win Senators' favor in the form of extra pork barrel funds to remove corrupt 
officials from government, particularly those who are Arroyo allies and/or appointees. In 
addition, it was revealed that the funds would often go to the pockets of legislators rather than 
the priority projects. There were also claims of corruption and leadership misconduct in the 
Department of Budget and Management, the very institution that administers the DAP. 
Aquino, however, refused to conduct investigations on these allegations as it involved his 
appointee and longtime ally, Florencio Abad. He also managed to block any other corruption 
investigations that would involve his key allies in the executive and legislative branches. This 
was felt by the public to be an apparent display of hypocrisy by an administration that 
promises greater transparency and accountability.36  
 
 
35 Some of the priority projects of the government include the upgrading of the mass rail transit (MRT) system 
and disaster mitigation and prevention.  
36 Richard Heydarian, “Philippines’ Competition Conundrum: A Nation of Oligopolies, Dynasties and Autocratic 
Nostalgia,” August 19, 2016.  https://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-javad-heydarian/philippines-
competition-c_b_8012788.html  
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Mamasapano Incident 
The conflict in Mamasapano, Maguindanao between the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) and rebel organizations Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is regarded one of the worst defeats against terrorism in 
Philippine history. The operation, called Oplan Exodus, was conducted on 25 January 2015 to 
serve arrest warrants to Malaysian terrorists Zulkifli Addhir (aka Marwan) and Basit Usman. 
But it unfortunately resulted in the death of the PNP's 44 Special Action Force (SAF44) 
members. This mission captured the attention of the public as Aquino was nowhere near 
public’s view after the clash. Instead, he appeared three days after to lead the opening of a car 
manufacturing plant than attend to the grieving families of the killed policemen. It revealed 
Aquino’s lack of sensitivity and remorse as he looked unapologetic for the failed mission. 
Being the commander-in-chief, Aquino, together with other high-ranking PNP officials, was 
heavily criticized for violating the chain of command. Aquino was primarily blamed for 
letting his close friend, resigned police chief Alan Purisima, play an active role in the mission 
despite his suspension over graft charges. Critics also claim that the debacle could have been 
prevented if there was proper coordination and intelligence plan with the Philippine Army.  
Typhoon Haiyan 
Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) struck the area of Eastern Visayas on 
November 8, 2013, displacing approximately 4 million individuals or 900,000 families in 44 
provinces. Death toll reached 6,000, making it one of the greatest typhoons to ever hit the 
country. Criticisms on Aquino was on the way he handled the disaster since he attempted to 
downplay the seriousness of the devastation few days after its landfall, saying that death toll 
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was overestimated and putting much of the blame on local officials37. The slow emergency 
response and post-disaster rehabilitation by the national government also triggered much 
disappointment from both the locals and the media. What’s worse, there were allegations on 
the misuse of public funds intended for the faster recovery and rehabilitation of the disaster-
stricken areas. In particular, roughly P20 billion for housing assistance to 200,000 families 
was never released by the government before the president stepped down from office, adding 
to billions of unutilized local and foreign donations. There were also allegations of improper 
disbursements, irregularities on procurement, undocumented project expenses, and 
questionable contracts.  
Unequal economic growth 
The macroeconomic growth under Aquino was mainly due to the remittances sent by 
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), and the fast-growing business process outsourcing (BPO) 
industry commonly owned by foreign investors. A more profound problem, however, is that 
the amount of wealth generated from these sources hardly reach the majority of the 
population. In fact, in 2011, the country's 40 richest families' cumulative wealth was 
equivalent to 75% of the country's GDP that year. This is reflected by a $13 billion or 37.95 
increase in their capital stocks in the year 2010-2011. It is hardly surprising that poverty and 
unemployment rates, among other basic development indicators remained high.  Added to 
this burden to the ordinary Filipino working class is the continuous problem on infrastructure. 
The improving economic performance of the country also meant a greater need for more 
reliable and improved system of public transport. Despite the promise of the government to 
expand the basic infrastructure by increasing GDP share of spending to 5%, Manila remained 
 
37 Aquino pointed his finger on the mayor of Tacloban, Leyte where most of deaths occurred, Alfred 
Romualdez, nephew of Imelda Marcos. It sparked speculations that Romualdez was singled out as he belongs 
to the Romualdez-Marcos clan, a political rival of the Aquinos. In his defense, Romualdez said that his 
preparations for the typhoon were approved by the national government 24 hours before its landfall.  
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to have one of the world’s worst traffic congestions. Its Metro Rail Transit (MRT) system 
also has numerous defects and undergoes repeated incidents of breakdown. The Ninoy 
Aquino International Airport (ironically named the late father of the incumbent) also 
frequently experienced embarrassing blackouts, besides its overcrowding and inefficiency 
woes. These setbacks on public transportation and traffic in the national capital were indeed 
detrimental to Aquino’s popularity and approval ratings. By the end of his term, he acquired a 
net zero approval rating in Metro Manila.  
The unmet promises and escalating expectations, particularly from the middle classes, 
have resulted to what Heydarian 38  calls “grievance politics.”  This discontent with the 
prevailing liberal democratic order, dominated by the elite, was used by populist Duterte to 
penetrate the national political arena and instigate a new leadership at the helm of Malacañan 
Palace to fix the mistakes of the past administrations. The rise of Duterte is regarded part of a 
worldwide populist phenomenon that has challenged the establishment in both advanced and 
developing democracies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy 
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V. CASE STUDY: THE PHILIPPINES UNDER POPULIST DUTERTE 
 
 This chapter considers the five key features of populism adapted from Paul Taggart’s 
analytical theory. He demonstrated that populism is characterized by (a) a critique of the 
internal and external establishment; (b) a heartland for “the people” that the populist message 
refers to; (c) a lack of core values; (d) a performance of a crisis and the need for more direct 
populist democracy; (e) a charismatic leadership combined with chameleonic nature to adapt 
to changing circumstances.  
 
 Adopting this theory in the context of the Philippines, this chapter argues that upon 
his assumption to office, Duterte has used populism to maintain a steady grip on power, while 
concurrently portraying “Others”, particularly members of the once dominant Liberal Party, 
the media, Roman Catholic Church and most controversially, drug users as enemies of the 
State. It also sheds light on how Duterte has been responding to various criticisms from 
external actors such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international human rights 
groups who, according to him, have been ‘attacking our sovereignty’; and looks into how he  
sustains his high popularity and trust ratings by framing the drug problem as a national crisis. 
Lastly, this paper presents the chameleonic nature of Duterte’s politics by looking at his 
coalition with relatively liberal institutions such as the Philippine National Police and Armed 
Forces of the Philippines, and his relationships with the Communist Left.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Elements of populism in Rodrigo Duterte’s politics as observed in his first three years in 
office 
 
5.1 ‘Othering’: The dangerous “others” and the enemies of the State 
  
Liberal institutions and political opponents 
 
Relatively liberal institutions, particularly the judicial and legislative branches, were 
quickly discredited upon Duterte’s election. The Aquino administration was often criticized 
for its weakness in enforcing the law and curbing criminality in the country. The “justice 
delayed” phenomenon in the country persisted as there were few major institutional reforms 
introduced. Example of which is the case of Maguindanao massacre in 2009 that resulted to 
deaths of 32 journalists which Aquino vowed to help resolve before he steps down from 
office. The trial has been affected by delays and to the disappointment of many, not a single 
suspect has been convicted until now. Secondly, the raid in the biggest and most crowded jail 
in the Philippines, the National Bilibid Prison, exposed the situations of drug lords, gang 
leaders and other powerful inmates who were secretly put in luxurious prison cells, and 
allowed to bring in illegal drugs. This controversy was particularly embarrassing to Aquino 
as criticisms arose to why this problem was never found out and investigated early in his term. 
In addition, the case on the pork barrel scandal was widely perceived to be selective. Cases 
were only filed against opposition legislators, which raised concerns about Aquino’s 
adherence to the rule of law.  
Perceptions on Aquino being particularly incompetent and soft on matters related to 
the justice system, and fight against criminality and drug abuse was taken advantage by 
Duterte. His disparagement of liberal democracy, particularly the ineffectiveness and 
corruption of the liberal elites, has acquired considerable public traction. He introduced his 
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“alternative” illiberal populist political order – anchored on a law and order campaign, and a 
new coalition group to counter the dominant liberal institutions.  
At the very onset, the Duterte administration has put to test the established democratic 
institutions. Legislators and critics, specifically those who are members of the Liberal Party, 
were also not spared by Duterte’s lashes and vulgarities. He exploited the legal system as a 
tool to obstruct any form of opposition. When Leila De Lima, former Justice Secretary under 
the Aquino government and a neophyte senator, initiated a senate inquiry on the war on drugs 
in her capacity as head of the Justice Committee of the Senate and advised him on the 
possible consequences in the International Criminal Court, Duterte was quick to accuse her of 
coddling druglords during her stint as Justice Secretary, and having an affair with her driver 
who also had roles associated to illegal drugs.  These accusations led Duterte’s allies in the 
Senate to remove De Lima as head of the Committee on Justice and launch investigations on 
her possible involvement in drugs and extra-marital affair. This proved her vulnerability in 
the context of a misogynist political culture perpetrated and tolerated by the president himself. 
In February 2017, she was arrested and convicted for drug-related cases.  
 
One of Duterte’s staunchest critics, Senator Antonio Trillanes, was the second 
legislator to be arrested in just two years. Trillanes has also criticized the drug war, accused 
the president's son and his cabinet members of being involved in corruption, and supported 
the ICC’s preliminary investigation into the alleged extrajudicial killings. 
 
Various rights groups have also alleged that Duterte is murdering many of his 
political opponents under the mask of his bloody drug war. Since Duterte took office in June 
2016, a total of 11 mayors and 6 vice mayors have been killed. This rise in the number of 
murdered local officials follows months after Duterte read out of a list of 158 officials 
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suspected of drug trade.39 Notable of these was the assassination of two provincial mayors in 
a span of two days. Tanauan City Mayor Antonio Halili’s assassination by a sniper during a 
flag ceremony in July 2018 was caught on video, causing mass panic. Halili was commonly 
renowned for “parading drug suspects in a walk of shame”, but was subsequently accused by 
Duterte for being connected to drug trade himself.  A day after Halili’s killing, Mayor 
Ferdinand Bote of General Tinio, Nueva Ecija was ambushed in his car by unidentified 
gunmen after leaving a meeting in Cabanatuan City, north of Manila.  
 
Duterte also publicly denounced human rights organizations, particularly the 
Commission on Human Rights, for their stance against Duterte’s drug war-related killings. 
He has repeatedly threatened to abolish or at least provide zero budget for the institution and 
block any investigations of CHR on possible abuses by the PNP. 
  
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has been cautious to face a sitting president, 
particularly after the former Chief Justice Renato Corona's impeachment trial during the 
Aquino presidency. Adding to this are various allegations of political influence and 
plagiarism of some judges and justices that might be used by Duterte to further demoralize 
the institution.   
 
The Media 
 
In its 2018 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders has cut the 
ranking of the Philippines from 127 a year ago to 133, out of 180 nations. This followed 
government threats, press restrictions, and last year's killings of four journalist, making the 
Philippines Asia's deadliest nation for reporters. 
 
39 Joseph Hincks, “Duterte is assassinating opponents under the cover of the drug war, Philippine Rights 
Groups say”. Time, July 5, 2018. https://time.com/5330071/philippines-mayors-political-assassination-duterte/ 
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Examples of violations include the blacklisting of journalists from the news site 
Rappler from covering Malacañan Palace, tax evasion and libel lawsuits against its owners, 
and investigation of its ownership structure that could lead to the closure of the network. 
Before Rappler, Duterte also personally threatened a tax case against the Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, the country's most prestigious newspaper, and flirted with the idea of denying ABS-
CBN, the country’s largest media network, its congressional franchise for critically reporting 
on the “drug war.”40 
The Roman Catholic Church 
 
Being predominantly Catholic41, much of Philippine history has been influenced by 
the Church. It became a more significant force in the country after it helped topple down the 
Marcos dictatorship in 1986. Church leaders completely embraced their position as protectors 
of democracy, thus securing a vital position in Philippine politics. After the Marcos 
presidency, they supported the reformist government established by the newly-elected 
president, Corazon Aquino. The Church, through the leadership of then Manila Archbishop 
Jaime Cardinal Sin, also played an important part in the impeachment hearing of former 
President Joseph Estrada, who was ultimately indicted for plunder and perjury charges. But 
the death of Cardinal Sin began a rather fragmented leadership in the Church, marked by a 
reorganization of the Archdiocese of Manila into dioceses with different bishops. The Church 
was also plagued by allegations of sexual abuses and internal conflicts, making it difficult for 
the clergy to take unified stance against then President Arroyo after she committed election 
fraud during the 2004 presidential elections and on the wiretapping scandal in 2005 (dubbed 
as “Hello Garci”). In the Aquino presidency, the Catholic Church took a strong stance against 
 
40 Carlos H. Conde, “A New Weapon Against Press Freedom in the Philippines”. The Globe and Mail, December 
2018,  https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-a-new-weapon-against-press-freedom-in-the-
philippines/  
41 More than 80% of Philippine population is Roman Catholic. (Jack Miller, “Religion in the Philippines,” 
https://asiasociety.org/education/religion-philippines)  
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the passage of the Reproductive Health Bill42 in the Philippine Congress, which would give 
greater access to contraception, maternal care, and sex education. While the bill was signed 
into law in 2013, the Church made huge efforts by using homilies as platforms for dissent, 
and having the Supreme Court and allies in Congress partially block or defund it.  
Things went on a big turnabout when Duterte took office. Although a significant 
voice in the human rights discussion in the country, the Catholic Church was challenged by 
Duterte who repeatedly threatened to reveal their sexual abuses, corruption involvement, and 
pointing at their strong position against greater access to reproductive health. These instances 
of intimidation put the Church’s power and influence in question. It struggled to even issue 
its first statement against Duterte’s crackdown of illegal drugs which killed 3,000 people in 
his first three months in office.  
 Drug Users 
 
With an unapologetic and foul-mouthed rhetoric, Duterte’s presidential campaign was 
anchored on a promise to a total crackdown of illegal drugs within three to six months and 
“fatten the fish of Manila Bay with the corpses of criminals.”43 In justifying this bloody war 
on drugs, he was able to depict the drug trade in the country as a serious threat to the 
country’s national security, claiming that because of the growing drug menace, the 
Philippines is on the verge of turning into a “narco-state.”44 This pledge was well-received by 
voters who had become increasingly fearful of the seemingly ever-growing social problems 
in the country, yet had shaken many observers in the international community, his political 
opponents, and international and local human rights organizations.   
 
42 Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines.  An Act Providing for a National Policy on Responsible 
Parenthood and Reproductive Health. http://www.gov.ph/2012/12/21/republic-act-no-10354/. 
43 ‘Duterte’s Talk of Killing Criminals Raises Fear in the Philippines’ The New York Times, 17 May 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines.html [Accessed 22/06/17] 
44  Nathaniel Gilbert Quimpo, “Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ The Securitization of Illegal Drugs and the Return of 
National Boss Rule”  in  A Duterte Reader. Cornell University Press, 145. 
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The message of Duterte in his drug war was clear: it is justifiable to humiliate and kill 
criminals for the sake of those who fear god and abide by the law. After he was sworn in as 
president on June 30, 2016, the number of killings related to his war on drugs has 
skyrocketed. In his first seven weeks alone, almost 1,800 people died as a result of the anti-
drug war, either through police operations or extrajudicial killings. 45  A study by the 
Philippine-based ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group reveals that a total of 5,317 
suspected drug users have been murdered from the period of July 2016 to December 2018. 
(Table 4.1). It is interesting to note that the number of drug-related fatalities came not only 
from legitimate operations by law enforcement agencies, but also by unknown gunmen either 
witnessed by other people or caught on CCTV. 
Table 4.1 Drug-related deaths, by type of incident, July 1, 2016 to December 18, 2018 
 
Source: ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group culled from ABS-CBN reports 
and other news  sites and press releases from PDEA and PNP 
 
 
Also, the number of fatalities recorded as a consequence of police activities in 2018 
was greater than in 2017, as shown in Figure 4.1. Between January 1 and December 18, 2018, 
there were 1,021 drug-related fatalities, 11% higher than the 916 people killed in 2017. 
 
45 Julio C. Teehankee and Mark R. Thompson, ‘The Vote in the Philippines: Electing a Strongman’ Journal 
of Democracy 27,4 (2016) 125-134 : 126.  
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Figure 4.1 Anti-drug operation-related deaths, 2017 vs 2018 
 
Source: ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group culled from ABS-CBN  
reports and other news  sites and press releases from PDEA and PNP 
 
5.2 Performance of a national crisis: Framing and exaggerating the drug problem as a 
threat to national security  
 
 Drug menace as Duterte's signature issue 
 
Duterte’s capturing of an ever-grimmer picture of the drug issue in the country 
continues to be an essential component of his overall political strategy. By continually 
framing the drug problem as a national security issue and exaggerating its extent, 
accompanied by his use of gutter language, he is able to justify his crackdown on drugs 
which cause public panic and “urgency for saving the republic.”46  
Though it cannot be denied that the Philippines has a long-standing problem on drugs, 
Duterte, for the past three years, has overstated its scope and scale. When his term started in 
2016, he claimed that there are about 4 million drug users in the country. Many are 
 
46 JC Punongbayan, “How Duterte’s exaggerations worsened the Philippines’ drug problem,” Rappler, 
https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/224583-analysis-how-duterte-exaggerations-worsened-drug-
problem-philippines 
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questioning the legitimacy of Duterte’s statement on the sheer scale of the drug problem. 
Until now, the government has not verified which intel agencies have assisted the president in 
his estimations. Whether these are based on collecting and triangulating individual reports 
from different state authorities and overseas partners remains unclear. But one is for sure, his 
figures contrasted sharply with the official statistics released in 2015 by the Dangerous Drugs 
Board (DDB), which estimated the number of drug users nationwide at just about 1.8 million. 
Despite the comparison in the numbers of the president and the DDB, United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime reports that the drug incidence rate of 2.3 percent in the country is still 
below the worldwide average of 5.2 percent.47 
Duterte’s overblown figures have profound implications in that the government 
determines how many people must be targeted to eradicate the drug demand in the country. 
This has led to the drawing up of notorious “drug list” with names of drug suspects, hundreds 
if not thousands, of whom have been killed either through legitimate police operations or by 
unknown gunmen. He stated by the end of his first year in office that over the next four to six 
years, the number of drug addicts would increase to over 10 million. Following this 
projection, by 2020, 14 million Filipinos will be drug addicted.  
Although not the first presidential candidate to make crime and drug his signature 
issue, Duterte was the first to portray it as an existential threat and have been consistently 
vocal about the violent approach he would adopt to suppress it. This appears to have a 
political logic. For one, the reputation of Duterte as an efficient Davao City Mayor was 
mainly due to his city-wide fighting of drug and crime. The Davao Death Squad, a group 
supposedly connected to Duterte that targets suspected criminals and drug dealers, is also 
publicly tolerated due to its low cost but high returns. As president, his nationwide 
 
47 ‘Are there 4 million drug addicts in the Philippines?’ The Philippine Star, December 16, 2016. 
https://www.philstar.com/other-sections/news-feature/2016/12/16/1654043/are-there-4-million-drug-
addicts-philippines 
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crackdown also provides a political narrative which makes Duterte the only one with moral 
compass and political will to save the country from the dangers brought by drugs and crime.  
Public attitude towards Duterte's war on drugs 
The president’s exaggeration of the drug problem seems to sit well with the public. It 
tracks closely with their demand for a more comprehensive and reliable action against 
lawlessness in the country. In fact, based on surveys, fighting crime, including drug-related 
offenses, is one of the top five priorities of most Filipino voters. A survey by Pulse Asia on 
March 23-28, 2018 reveals that 27% of participants recognized the fight against crime as 
their fifth most pressing concern, with as many as 81% of participants praising the 
achievement of the Duterte government in this matter, as shown in Table 4.2. In terms of 
demographics, those belonging to Class ABC put the biggest significance on fighting crime 
(45%), as compared to Class D (25%) and Class E (25%), which are more worried with other 
domestic problems. 
Table 4.2 Perceived urgency of selected national issues and the national    
administration’s performance ratings (March 23-28, 2018)  
 
       Source: Pulse Asia, 2018 
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In another survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in September 
2016, more than 80% of the respondents were satisfied with Duterte’s war on drugs (Fig 4.2). 
It is interesting to note, however, that despite the high approval for the administration's anti-
illegal drugs campaign, 71%, or a majority of respondents, said they find it "very important" 
for police to keep drug suspects alive (Fig. 4.3). This paradoxical information might imply 
that while most Filipinos are in principle in agreement with the president's anti-drug 
campaign, they have reservations about the approach and process. 
 
Fig. 4.2 Satisfaction with government’s campaign against legal drugs (September 2016) 
Source: SWS Third Quarter Social Weather Report, September 2016 National Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Importance of keeping illegal drug trade suspects alive (September 2016) 
Source: SWS Third Quarter Social Weather Report, September 2016 National Survey 
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5.3 ‘Heartland’: Defiance of international backlash 
 
 For Duterte, the total crackdown on drugs is the realization of his campaign promise 
and the nationalization of the law enforcement approach he utilized in Davao City. What’s 
more, he is under high levels of public expectation and pressure as he promised to fully wipe 
out the proliferation of crime and drugs in the country in the first 3-6 months of his term. 
Despite this, he decided to up the ante and declared that he “will not stop until the last drug 
lord, financier, pusher is put behind bars...or below the ground if they so wish” during his 
first State of the Nation Address (SONA).48  
 
 The president’s fight against drugs, however, has raised extensive global concern 
about the country's human rights and rule of law. In the 2018 Global Peace Index, the 
Philippines was only next to North Korea as the least peaceful country in Asia. The report 
states that the poor standing of the country was partly because of “a bloody was against drugs 
and crime (that) has been extended nationwide” under Duterte.49  
 
 The Duterte administration has been accused by several members of the international 
human rights organizations of promoting vigilante murders. Amnesty International blamed 
Duterte and other populist leaders Trump, Orban, and Erdogan for pursuing a “divisive fear 
mongering” and “wielding a toxic agenda that hounds, scapegoats and dehumanizes entire 
groups of people.” In the Philippines, the ‘other’ are the alleged drug pushers/users and 
criminals. 50  This makes Duterte the first Filipino president likely to be prosecuted by 
 
48 ‘Duterte: 'We will not stop until last drug lord has surrendered' SunStar Philippines, July 25, 2016, 
https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/87972 
49 Frances Mangosing, ‘PH is 2nd ‘least peaceful’ country in Asia Pacific’ Inquirer.net , June 6, 2018, 
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/998244/ph-is-2nd-least-peaceful-country-in-asia-pacific 
50 ‘Politics of demonization’ breeding division and fear’, Amnesty International, February 22, 2017 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/02/amnesty-international-annual-report-201617/ 
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international courts, particularly those under the auspices of the ICC.51 In a statement, ICC’s 
chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda voiced out her deep concern with the current situation in the 
country, and warned that “any person in the Philippines who incites or engages in acts of 
mass violence including by ordering, requesting, encouraging, or contributing, in any other 
manner, to the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC is potentially liable to 
prosecution before the Court.” She further emphasized that her office “will be closely 
following the developments in the Philippines in the weeks to come and record any instance 
of incitement or resort to violence with a view to assessing whether a preliminary 
examination into the situation of the Philippines needs to be opened.”52 
 
 However, Duterte, who has already developed a strong grip on political institutions, 
does not appear to be concerned about the ICC's imminent filing of charges and prosecution. 
He and his officials categorically and consistently rejected any wrongdoing, declaring 
allegations of extensive breach of human rights as biased, based on questionable and 
misleading proofs, and/or politically driven. In response to the ICC’s launch of a preliminary 
investigation over the possibility of crimes against humanity in the ongoing crackdown on 
drugs, Duterte withdrew the Philippines’ membership in the ICC, arguing that the court “can 
never acquire jurisdiction over my person, not in a million years."  
 
The US government, under then President Barack Obama, also conveyed its 
reservations about the clear disregard for the legal processes and the unlawful killings.53 In 
fact, during the 2016 ASEAN Summit in Laos, the two presidents' encounter did not reflect 
 
51 Perfecto Caparas. “Explainer: Yes, International Criminal Court can prosecute Duterte for killing spree”, 
Rappler. March 6, 2017. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/150285-international-criminal-court-trial-
duterte-killings 
52 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, concerning the situation 
in the Republic of the Philippines.” ICC-CPI.int. October 13, 2016. https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item. 
aspx?name=161013-otp-stat-php 
53 Eric Vincent Batalla, “Divided Politics and Economic Growth in the Philippines”, Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 35, 3 (2016), 161–186. 
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the long-standing warm friendship between the two countries, especially during the term of 
Aquino. Before their planned one-on-one talk, Duterte was fast to remind Obama to respect 
the anti-drug war or else he “would curse him in the forum.” In response, the US president 
dismissed his meeting with Duterte. Meanwhile, Duterte retaliated by not attending Obama's 
meeting with Southeast Asian leaders.  
 
In one of his invective-filled public statements, President Duterte also reacted to 
threats of aid withdrawal by the US government and other international groups, saying, “We 
have a problem here trying to preserve our society and you mess up by [raising] human rights 
[issues]. You threaten us using your assistance. How do you look at us? Mendicants?.”54 He 
also reminded public officials to not beg for “crumbs of foreign aid” at the expense of the 
country’s dignity. Thus, wanting the US to treat the Philippines more fairly, Duterte at one 
point proposed the idea of mandating US citizens to obtain a visa to the Philippines, as 
Filipinos are required to do the same, usually at a high cost, when they visit the US. 
 
The president has declared his intention to defy any intervention by any external 
actors, who, according to him, are “attacking our sovereignty.” His defiance is anchored on 
his argument that the criminal justice system in the country is too slow and ineffective to be 
relied on and respected. He presents himself as the lone protector of the republic that is on the 
verge of a breakdown; the only person whom the people can rely in getting the bad guys, at 
any cost, including sidestepping standard operating procedures of law and extinguishing 
checks and balances in the country.  
 
 
 
 
54 “Duterte dares US, EU: Pull out aid to Philippines”, Philippine Star, October 6, 2016 
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/06/1630967/duterte-dares-us-eu-pull-out-aid-philippines 
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5.4 Vagueness or lack of core values 
  
Party ideologies in the Philippines are weak, as evidenced by widespread political 
turncoatism and party-switching which has become part and parcel of Philippine politics. In 
particular, the legislature, composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate, has the 
reputation of defections in favor of the winning presidential candidate’s party. In fact, 
between 1987 and 2016, an average of 33% of members of the House of Representatives 
switched parties; of this number, 32% usually transfers to the political party of the president.  
 
Duterte’s Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) or Philippine 
Democratic Party - Power of the People is among those parties without sharp ideological 
profile. It used to be a minor party that only had three seats in the House of Representatives 
and one in the Senate prior to the 2016 general elections. However, it soon became the ruling 
party in both houses because of “political butterflies” who were under the predominant 
Liberal Party. As soon as Duterte’s presidential victory, more than 300 legislators switched 
party affiliations. Many of these defections occurred despite the warning of Liberal Party’s 
leadership that the Philippines will sooner or later be under an authoritarian rule, and the 
failure of the Party to reverse its growing image as a Party of traditional politicians (aka 
“trapos”). It can be speculated that the immediate transfer of these Liberals to Duterte’s party 
is to protect themselves from prosecution, following the controversies under the Aquino 
administration. A more obvious motive behind this party switching is the promise of access 
to patronage.  
 
 PDP-Laban is no populist party per se, but Duterte has been able to stage a populist 
mobilization strategy to build a mass of supporters and retain power. In the 2019 midterm 
elections, for example, the popular Duterte helped consolidate block votes accumulated 
through traditional bailiwicks and political machineries. This was particularly true for three 
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of Duterte’s most favored senatorial candidates – Special Assistant to the President 
Christopher “Bong” Go, former police chief Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa, and Presidential 
Adviser on Political Affairs Francis Tolentino. Struggling for name recognition in the 
senatorial race crowded by familiar and established names in Philippine politics, these three 
candidates all managed to win a senate seat. Being close to the president, they were able to 
gain more public awareness and converted this awareness into actual votes.  
 
5.5 Charismatic leadership through mass mobilization projects and vague policies and 
agenda 
 
 Exploitation of national surveys to strengthen populist hegemony 
  
 Various surveys conducted from the start of Duterte’s administration in June 2016 
show that Duterte continues to enjoy high levels of approval and performance ratings, 
ranging from 86% to 80% and 80% to 76%, respectively. A Pulse Asia study in 2017 finds 
that Duterte remains the most trusted among Philippine presidents from 1999 to 2017.55 
Compared to former presidents Benigno S. Aquino III (2010–2016) Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (2001–2010) and Joseph Estrada (1998–2001), only Duterte was able to attain the 90 
% mark, reaching 91% in July 2016 right after he took office. He is followed by Aquino, 
whose highest rating of 80% in October 2010 is 11 points lower than Duterte’s. Meanwhile, 
Arroyo and Estrada’s highest trust ratings were 55% (October 2001) and 44% (October 2000), 
respectively. The same holds true for performance rating in which Duterte’s highest rating 
peaked at 86% in September 2016, compared to Aquino’s 79% in October 2010. Estrada 
achieved 74% in May 1999, and 63% for Arroyo in March 2001. Similarly, SWS reported 
 
55 “Comparative Performance and Trust Ratings of Presidents (May 1999 to September 2017),” Pulse Asia, 9 
November 2017; “Duterte more trusted than his 3 predecessors – survey,” Rappler. 10 November 2017.  
44 
 
that by the first quarter of 2019, the Duterte Administration achieved a record high net 
satisfaction rating of +72% for general performance, classified by SWS as “excellent.” 56  
 
 Negative portrayals by local and international media have so far not affected Duterte’s 
popularity among the ordinary Filipino.  The “excellent” ratings he gained from various 
surveys conducted in his first three years in office manifest an important characteristic for 
national leaders in Philippine society – charismatic leadership. He has effectively exploited 
these surveys to place himself as a “president for all” - given that his support base transcends 
gender, sector, generations, social class. He also continues to have the broad support of 
different political factions. Duterte sure knows how to use this to strengthen his populist 
movement. Coming from a political family in the city of Davao and having served in local 
politics for more than 20 years, Duterte is considered a veteran political boss or a traditional 
politician. For much of his years in power as the local chief executive of Davao, he has 
witnessed national-level political arrangements and relations that are characterized by 
clientelism and patronage, money politics, and coercive violence. 57  Even so, Duterte’s 
governance style can also be viewed as unorthodox because of his harsh criticisms and often 
politically incorrect statements about the institutions that have paved the way for these 
irregularities – the liberal oligarchy, the Catholic Church, and the US – which have been the 
staple during his public engagements.  
 
The sustained popularity of Rodrigo Duterte, as shown by both Pulse Asia and SWS 
surveys, make it possible for his supporters to claim that he indeed represents and embodies 
the majority’s voice. These same followers have anchored their value judgments on what is 
moral, true, right and democratic on the principle of majoritarianism. In short, the choice of 
 
56 Duterte admin satisfaction rating rises to 'excellent' in Q1 2019: SWS. ABS-CBN News, 03 May 2019.  
57 Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philip-pines, Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2009; John Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999. 
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the majority becomes absolutely and automatically moral, true, right, and democratic. 
Explaining this outpour of support for Duterte can be summed up into three: employment of 
an efficient and effective campaign strategy, particularly in the cyberspace, that well-
resonated to the hopes, fears, and resentment of the voting population; the Philippine 
presidential and electoral system that relies on the plurality method or the election of the 
highest polling candidate and in which politically charged statements are not sufficiently 
scrutinized such as in a parliamentary set-up; and the embodiment of people’s anger against 
the predominant liberal establishment paving for a “protest” vote in favor of Duterte.  
 
  Duterte’s populist rhetoric at the helm of public discourse 
  
 The political language that Duterte helped popularize and normalize in his 
presidential campaign has continued to dominate public discourse. Characterized by loud, 
and domineering speech that is often filled with vague and sweeping statements, he is able to 
provide simplistic solutions to complex social problems, and perfectly creates for himself an 
image of a father of the nation that stands between the voiceless people and the corrupt elites.  
For his supporters, if not for most citizens, this, of course, is no issue. For them, Duterte 
effectively speaks the collective mind of the majority – the ardent desire for law and order, a 
more disciplined populace, and long-term development that reaches poorest and the farthest.  
 
 The cyberspace, a crucial virtual arena that helps shape public opinion during the 
election season, was effectively used by Duterte’s campaign team to boost his presidential 
run. In fact, the Oxford University’s Computational Propaganda Research Project58 found out 
that with a USD 200,000 budget, a group of social media campaigners, known as keyboard 
armies or trolls, have been recruited to boost Duterte's internet presence. After the elections, 
 
58 Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, ‘Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized 
Social Media Manipulation’, in Samuel Woolley & Philip N. Howard (eds.), Working Paper 2017.12, Oxford: 
Project on Computational Propaganda. 
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it is alleged that this group has continued supporting Duterte through propaganda work; 
Duterte himself appointed his famous performer-turned-blogger supporter as Assistant 
Secretary for Social Media at the official communications office of the palace. Many fake 
social media accounts/profiles are being used to provoke public outrage and spread 
disinformation towards political rivals of the Duterte government; however, the bigger, most 
profound problems is that real people with legitimate social media accounts have been 
heavily influenced and have started behaving badly and expressing messages of divisiveness 
and hate. This indicates that social media can be used not just as a tool for promoting anti-
democratic ideas, while facilitating a populist politician’s legitimacy, but also help in forming 
populist sentiments and behaviors through online memes, one-liners, and insults. This 
dominance of Duterte’s populist rhetoric on public discourse significantly influences the state 
of the country’s liberal democracy. It is not a political propaganda that deceives or misleads 
the public, but one that echoes the current realities and resentments of the people, their lived 
experiences, hopes, insecurities, and fears. Although social media increase the political 
awareness and participation of the public, it can also lead to behaviors, often not through 
constructive dialogues and interactions, which do not contribute to or even hamper the 
process of nation-building.  
 
 Duterte’s public mobilization projects has made it easier to him to forward and justify 
his ideas of a Revolutionary Government which he floated as early as 2017, and the revision 
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution to transition the country from a unitary to a federal form 
of government. While Duterte won the presidency through a democratically led general 
election, most of the supporters of the revolutionary government act as if they have initiated 
and established a political revolution. Duterte justifies the idea of a revolutionary government 
to repair the government, curb corruption and crime, and block efforts to destabilize the 
government. Also, he has long advocated for a federalist form of government which he 
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claims would lead to better delivery of services to the people, and equally distribute public 
funds to all regions which has traditionally been concentrated in the “Imperial Manila.” These 
agenda are now subject to major contestations and debates in both the lower and upper 
houses of Congress, and are expected to make drastic changes to the country’s political 
landscape in the coming years.    
 
 Vague policies and agenda: TRAIN and the ‘Build, Build, Build’ 
 
 During his campaign for the top post of the land, Duterte did not show much interest 
on issues in economic policy. In fact, his ten-point economic agenda, developed to appease 
worried domestic and foreign businesses, was largely based on the economic policies of his 
predecessor Aquino. However, in order to further justify and legitimize his populist actions 
and create an image that would make himself closer to “the people”, Duterte has introduced 
policies such as the Tax Reforms for Acceleration and Inclusion Act or TRAIN and the Build, 
Build, Build program.  
 
 During his first SONA, Duterte conveyed his desire to enhance the tax system of the 
country. The tax reform will be used to finance public projects that are meant to raise people 
from poverty, create the country’s Golden Age of Infrastructure, and maintain strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals.59 Making it clear that the poorest and most disadvantaged are 
at the core of his tax reform, Duterte signed the TRAIN law in December 2017. He proudly 
announced that it is a “fulfillment of a campaign promise,” describing it further as “the 
administration’s biggest Christmas gift to the Filipino people as 99 percent of the taxpayers 
will benefit from the simpler, fairer and more efficient tax system.”60  Through the law, 
salaried workers’ income tax rates were cut down in order to increase their disposable income 
 
59 Department of Finance. “PRRD certifies tax reform bill as urgent” May 29, 2017, http://www.dof.gov.ph 
/taxreform/index.php/2017/05/24/netizens-back-tax-reform 
60“Duterte signs tax reform, 2018 budget into law,”ABS- CBN News, December 19,2017, https://news.abs-
cbn.com/business/12/19/17/duterte-signs-tax-reform-2018-budget-into-law 
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and purchasing power. To compensate for this, higher taxes were imposed on goods and 
services that directly affect Filipino consumers, such as basic commodities, electricity, and 
public transportation. This has resulted in a rapid rise in inflation, averaging 4.8 percent on 
the first half of 2017 and extending to a nine-year record high of 6.7 percent on the second 
half of the same year.61 Higher prices of food and oil, excise taxes, and weak peso have 
intensified the inflation level. Because of this, several individuals and groups criticized the 
law as it would only be beneficial to the rich and middle classes, and detrimental to the poor. 
This could not only worsen the country’s problems on inequality, inflation and poverty that 
have long been persistent in the country, but may also lead to the dwindling of President 
Duterte’s popularity and support in the long run.   
 
 At the start of his term, Duterte also launched the “Build, Build, Build” program, an 
ambitious PHP 8 trillion infrastructure development program aimed at ushering the golden 
age of infrastructure in the country. This program will be funded through the revenues raised 
from the TRAIN law, and also from Official Development Assistance (ODAs). Duterte’s 
promise was simple: by increasing spending on infrastructure, the country will see a general 
improvement in facilities that will attract foreign investments into the country, which in turn, 
would bring employment and business opportunities to Filipinos, emancipating them from 
poverty. However, while the program is off to a promising start, many of the infrastructure 
projects are moving ahead slowly because of difficulties in securing loans, and bureaucratic 
hurdles. Worse, three years in Duterte’s presidency, but the country still continues to lag 
behind its peers in terms of perceived quality in infrastructure, as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
61 "Philippines Inflation Rate,” Trading Economics, December 5, 2018, https://tradingeconomics.com 
/Philippines/inflation-cpi 
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Fig. 4.4 Perceived quality of infrastructure 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum 
 
 
5.6 Chameleonic Nature: Coalitions with the PNP, AFP and the Communist Left  
 
In his first months as president, Duterte was able to create a new national coalition 
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP), and 
the communist left. As Davao City’s mayor for 20 years before being catapulted to the 
nation’s highest office, this is no longer new to him. After the fall of Marcos regime in 1986, 
Duterte became Davao City’s mayor. Dealing with problems of civil war in the city, “he was 
instrumental for peace talks with the para-military groups on both ends of the ideological 
spectrum and managed to reach a de facto ceasefire.” 62  Because of his profound 
understanding of Marxism and the influence of his former professor of university and 
communist thinker, Jose Maria Sison, he earned the confidence of far-left organizations. He 
also befriended former members of communist rebel groups such as Leoncio Evasco who 
served as the Secretary of the Cabinet until late 2018. On the part of the police, he made huge 
 
62 Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte 
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investments in improving their capabilities by providing more incentives and upgrading their 
equipment. He also focused on ending the problem of illegal drugs and crime, running after 
corrupt officials, and overseeing the inflow of investments in the city. It is no wonder that 
Duterte is endeared by residents of Davao City, as evidenced by his almost 99% performance 
satisfaction rating as mayor in mid-2016.63   
 
The Philippine National Police (PNP), in particular, has long been known to have ties 
with local politicians. Duterte’s rule in Davao was no different. He had good relationships 
with the local PNP that when he won the presidency, appointed his local police chief Ronald 
“Bato (The Rock)” Dela Rosa as chief of the national PNP. In his first few months as 
president, Duterte has promised greater support for the PNP - allocating bigger budget and 
incentives, and expanding their national significance and status. This is in line with their 
significant role in Duterte’s crackdown on illegal drugs. Duterte also announced his plans of 
reviving the Philippine constabulary, a civilian police force under the AFP once designated 
by Ferdinand Marcos to implement peace and order during Martial Law.  
 
Duterte also managed to gain the support of communist left during his mayorship in 
Davao. In fact, his Secretary to the Cabinet, Leoncio Evasco, was once a communist whom 
Duterte sent to jail but later befriended. He also appointed several communist leaders to key 
cabinet positions, including Judy Taguiwalo (Secretary for Social Welfare and Development), 
Rafael Mariano (Secretary for Agrarian Reform), and Liza Maza (Secretary for the National 
Anti-Poverty Commission). These communist leaders have also pushed for government 
 
63 Pia Ranada, “Rody Duterte: The man, the mayor the president,” Rappler.com. http://www.rappler.com/ 
newsbreak/in-depth/137583-rodrigo-duterte-philippine-president-profile.; Sheila Coronel, “I Will Kill All the 
Drug Lords: The Making of Rodrigo Duterte,” The Atlantic.com. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2016/09/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-manila-drugs-davao/500756/. 
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actions on issues in short-term contractualization, higher minimum wage, and increased 
benefits for workers which many business leaders have vehemently opposed.64  
 
The coalition with the PNP, AFP, and communist groups was particularly helpful for 
Duterte. His critical remarks against the US and EU, and his provocation of anti-colonial 
nationalism gained praises from the communist groups which, for the longest time, have been 
in adversarial relations with the West. Added to this was his ardent support for working out a 
concrete and clear peace agreement between these groups and the government. He has also 
gained the support of the rank-and-file police and military officers which helped prevent 
further hostilities between military and the communist groups, and creating a unified stance 
away from the US. Not surprising, because of these cordial relations with the president, the 
communist groups, often at the forefront of opposing violations of human rights, are often 
silent or even tolerant of Duterte's clear human rights violations through his drug war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 John McBeth, “Duterte Always Loved Communists – Except When He Was Killing Them,” South China 
Morning Post (2016). www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/203832 0/duterte-always-loved-
communists-except-when-he-was-killing> 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Summary  
This case study was anchored on a desire to empirically examine the nuances of 
Rodrigo Duterte’s regime and major developments in the Philippines in his first three years of 
presidency. With the research question: ‘What are the central elements in Rodrigo Duterte’s 
populist politics dubbed as ‘Dutertismo’65 as observed in his first three years in office?’, it 
adopted the analytical theory on populism put forward by Paul Taggart which suggests that 
populism is characterized by (a) a critique of the internal and external establishment; (b) a 
heartland for “the people” that the populist message refers to; (c) a lack of core values; (d) a 
sense of crisis and the need for more direct populist democracy; and (e) a charismatic 
leadership combined with chameleonic nature to adapt to changing circumstances.  
 
Employing Taggart’s theory in analyzing secondary resources such news reports, 
public speeches, survey results, and official policy documents, this study suggests that in the 
first half of President Duterte’s term, he has employed his own brand of populism known as 
Dutertismo to: 
1.) maintain a steady grip on power, while concurrently portraying “Others” 
particularly members of the once dominant Liberal Party, the media, Roman 
Catholic Church and most controversially, drug users as enemies of the State;  
2.) deal with reactions from external actors such as the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and international human rights groups who, according to him, have been 
‘attacking our sovereignty’;  
3.)  frame and exaggerate the drug problem as a national security crisis; 
 
65 Dutertismo was first coined by Filipino sociologist Randy David to describe Rodrigo Duterte as the “Filipino 
incarnation of a style of governance that is enabled by public’s faith in the capacity of a tough-talking, willful, 
and unorthodox leader to carry out drastic actions to solve the nation’s persistent problems.” 
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4.)  sustain his popularity through his vague policies and agenda, and proactive mass  
mobilization projects in social media and national surveys; and  
5.)  build coalitions with relatively liberal institutions such as the Philippine National  
Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Communist Left. 
 
6.2 Conclusion: Philippine society in the era of Dutertismo 
 
When the Marcos dictatorship ended in 1986 through the People Power Revolution, 
people became hopeful for a new kind of politics and government, the EDSA Republic, 
anchored on the liberal democratic values, principles, and institutions. But while liberal 
democracy continued to dominate in the succeeding administrations, it has also perpetuated 
many of the country’s enduring problems and tragedies. It has failed to deliver on its 
promises and meet escalating expectations, particularly from the middle classes. This failure 
of the EDSA system paved the way for Duterte’s success.  
 
Despite his predecessor’s personal popularity, president Duterte was able to exploit  
the vulnerability of the ruling liberal democratic establishment, and introduced a new era of 
illiberal populist Dutertismo. It is not surprising then that with his strongman image, he 
successfully and effectively tapped to the general sense of frustration and resentment of the 
voting public by providing seemingly simplistic solutions to many of the country’s complex 
problems, coupled by a fierce rhetoric aimed at the alienating the Catholic Church, media, 
and drug users. Ironically, this interruption of the politics-as-usual is also hinged on the 
perpetuation and exploitation of the very same social structures that led to the failures of the 
thirty years of democratization following the end of Martial Law. While he spoke against the 
oligarchs, on the front lines of his bloody anti-drug war is police force with a deeply flawed 
institutional culture, and on the sidelines is a seemingly complicit and cruel public who turn a 
blind eye to the growing number of fatalities in the name of Duterte’s drug war. 
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As clearly observed in the first three years of the Duterte government, there is an 
apparent disregard for the protection for the “right of life” as entrenched in the Philippine 
Constitution. By undermining the rights of alleged drug criminals, political opponents and the 
media, and feistily responding to international backlash, Duterte’s politics deviates from the 
tenets of democracy – accountability to the law, upholding of human rights and notions of 
equality, and employment of equal protection. This is particularly dangerous for a democratic 
country that defeated authoritarian rule 30 years ago. The violent approach to combat the 
spread of illegal drugs that he implemented as mayor of Davao City has been scaled-up 
nationwide, prompting a new “normal” in the country’s political landscape. For Duterte, 
human rights only apply to those who are “god-fearing” and law-abiding citizens, not to the 
alleged drug criminals; guaranteeing protection to the former, and absolute elimination to the 
latter. But despite the rampant violation of human rights under his watch, the Duterte 
government continues to enjoy high ratings in national opinion surveys, suggesting 
widespread popular support from those who have been manipulated into thinking that the 
country is on the brink of a breakdown. 
 
This heightened level of violence in the country is truly peculiar as it was not 
observed in succeeding governments following the collapse of Marcos dictatorship in the 
1980s. Scholars of Philippine politics, journalists, and the like all agree that no other 
Philippine president has ever secured the presidency anchored on the promise to execute 
criminals, carried out this promise, and still received such strong public support. 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
5.3 Discussion of Implications 
 
For policymaking 
 
This thesis provides a different perspective on the discussions of Rodrigo Duterte’s 
populist politics as it explored significant developments in the country in his first three years 
in power. The findings suggest some reforms that the government may consider 
implementing towards the second half of his term. The government’s crackdown on drugs, 
for one, has been mainly fixated on the poor drug users, while failing to address the main 
sources of the country’s drug problem. Looking at international best practices and reviewing 
empirical evidences, the Duterte administration could instead adopt a more health-based 
approach in dealing with the drug problem. Thus, instead of alienating important institutions 
such as the Catholic Church, the media, and civil society, the government could forge a 
partnership with them, together with the AFP and PNP, to help rebuild trust and curb the drug 
challenges, particularly among the youth. It is also essential trace and suppress the sources of 
drugs to help address the root cause of this problem.  
In terms of policies in the tax reform and infrastructure, it would impact more 
Filipinos if the reforms and investments go beyond the “Imperial Manila” and other 
metropolitan areas. They should be strategically developed in order to reach more 
populations and regions that are yet to benefit from the country’s economic boom.  
The Duterte government can use the remaining three years in creating real positive 
changes in the lives of the vast majority of Filipinos. Beyond mere populist-sounding 
promises, deep structural reforms are imperative to help ensure more inclusive development 
and less socio-economic and political division in the Philippines. 
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For future researches 
The scope of this case study is on the first three years of the Duterte government. 
Future researches on the populist government of Duterte may employ quantitative or 
qualitative approaches to analyze and examine the second half of his term. This would bring a 
better and more holistic understanding of how the populist leader employs his brand of 
populism known as Dutertismo, and how it affects the Philippines’ political and social 
realities.  
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